Democratic Strategy After the 2024 Election

In the 2024 election cycle, Democrats faced a ballot-box rebuke of shocking proportions. The party suffered defeats across both chambers of the legislature and lost the presidency to Donald Trump, a fact which will have dramatic political consequences for the next four years and beyond. A wide variety of explanations can (and has) been made for the Democratic presidential defeat, including campaign failures, Biden’s long and disastrous reelection campaign, and the salience of specific issues, especially inflation (Thompson 2024). Each of these factors likely affected, to a certain degree, the outcome of the election. However, a shifting partisan balance amongst formerly Democratic sections of the electorate holds more explanatory power. The Democratic Party must rethink its presidential campaign strategy in the wake of 2024, even though the Democrats were operating within a strongly hostile political environment. I argue that the party should renew a focus on class politics, embrace new technologies to make inroads with politically disaffected voters, and articulate a clear vision for the long-term future of the United States in response to a disastrous performance in 2024.

The Democratic Party faced strong political countercurrents, with inflation, post-COVID dissatisfaction, an unpopular incumbent, and a short campaign season. The “fundamentals” for presidential election prediction in political science hold that economic performance and incumbent president popularity strongly predict election outcomes (Campbell 2005). This model would suggest that Democrats faced a structurally uphill battle and would not be expected to win an election in 2024. Biden is an extremely unpopular incumbent and voter fears about the economy generally (and inflation specifically) were high, according to both exit polling and polling from as early as a year before the election (Anand 2023, CNN 2024). This problem is magnified by the specific political toxicity of high inflation, which voters tend to see as a serious economic problem attributable principally to government and as decoupled from their own wage growth (Stantcheva 2024). Further, incumbents globally, in the wake of COVID, have faced serious challenges when seeking reelection. Across a variety of democracies, incumbents lost eminently winnable elections largely due to soaring prices (an aftereffect of COVID) and broader anxieties surrounding government performance (Lindsay 2024, Boehm 2024). Finally, pundits have argued that Biden’s failure to withdraw from the 2024 campaign sooner doomed the Harris campaign. Harris, in this view, had too little time to establish a clear national brand or distance herself from the Biden administration, while Democrats could not work out internal divisions through the primary process (Polgreen et al 2024). Each of these explanations are compelling in their own right and provide a partial picture of why Democrats lost the presidency.

These headwinds were, however, not unilaterally responsible for the Democratic loss, making a powerful case for a party-wide course correction. Most notably, Harris lost voters from historically Democratic constituencies, complicating the story that this was simply a tough election year. The party might expect lower turnout or a loss in swing voters in response to a bad year as frustrated voters threw out an unpopular establishment, as was reflected in dissatisfaction among late-breaking voters across other democracies, but a coalitional realignment would come as unexpected news (Arceneaux 2024). Exit polling reveals that this is exactly what happened: Democrats bled voters from core constituencies such as young voters, working-class voters, and Latino voters relative to 2020, especially amongst men of all groups (CNN 2024, Molski 2024). Interpreting exit polling is complicated—exit polls have especially wide margins of error, a tendency toward nonresponse bias, and interpretations of exit polling tend to be overdetermined by election outcome—and the 2024 election represents just one data point, so extrapolating from this election to long-term realignment trends may be complicated (Yglesias 2024). Nevertheless, county-level election data may support such an extrapolation (providing early cues to a more systematic analysis of returns), as counties with high Latino or working-class populations continued to shift rightward (Leip 2024, Yglesias 2024). Many of the other arguments that this election’s result was predetermined by political conditions are limited. Campaign length, for instance, does not appear to exert a strong causal influence on election outcomes (Panagopoulos 2013). Further, the Harris campaign could, reasonably, have articulated a more strongly divergent economic view rather than relying on voter satisfaction with the economy (Stephens 2024). However, a case for a strategic shift would remain pertinent even if this election were not representative of long-term voter preferences. Shifts in young and minority voters suggest that Democrats, to compete on a structurally hostile electoral map, may no longer be able to rely on demographic shifts to deliver electoral results (Bimes lecture 10/24, Walter 2022). Even if this outcome does not represent a “tectonic shift” of voters away from the Democrats, the party needs a coalition that is more resilient against short-term identitarian shocks if they are to prevent an increasingly radical Republican Party from consistently gaining power (Sides et al 2023). Without these groups serving as a reliable base, siphoning centrist voters may be an unsuccessful coalitional strategy, necessitating a longer-term approach to partisan realignment.

A principal Democratic strategic shift must be an expansion of Democratic Party voter outreach to new media technologies, expanding the reach of the party to younger and less engaged voters. The Democratic Party suffered an exodus of young voters in 2024. Democrats won voters between the ages of 18 and 29 by 24 points in 2020 but won the same group by just 11 points this year (CNN 2020, CNN 2024). Behind much of this shift was a shift in young men’s voting behavior. Harris won by a margin of 24 points amongst young women but lost by 2 points amongst young men, historically a Democratic group (CNN 2024). Much of this shift in preferences can be attributed to the rise of new right-wing new media. The “manosphere”, a collection of podcasts and online spaces with masculine overtones and laced through with conservative ideology, may have played a significant role in shaping the decisions of these men (Marcus 2024). It also likely increased young men’s own misogyny and their tolerance for the Trump campaign’s persistently misogynistic rhetoric (Dowd 2024). While the gender gap in partisanship is a longstanding and long-growing political phenomenon within the United States, the acceleration of this shift, especially amongst young men and men of color, demands an expansion of Democratic outreach (Hopkins and Grossman 2024). Young voter outreach must become a larger feature of Democratic politics.

Two approaches should be considered to address youth defection. First, the Democratic Party must alter its approach to media messaging. While the party spent massively on advertising in 2024, most was spent on television, a medium few young voters consume, rather than new media (Barbaro et al 2024). Future presidential contenders should consider advertising via social media platforms alongside television and appearing on podcasts. While this certainly represents a break from traditional models of presidential communication, presidents have always looked to reach voters over new mediums, often to great success (Ellis 2022). Second, the party must pursue structural policy changes to increase young voter turnout. The Democrats still retain a sizable advantage amongst young voters, but they represent a disproportionately small share of voters. This may owe to a failure to move between “civic attitudes” and “civic action” that could be rectified by reducing requirements to vote (Hillygus and Holbein 2020). The party could move to increase young voter engagement by attempting to reduce procedural requirements for primary voting. Further reforms should include either the creation of alternative social media platforms or more stringent regulation of existing platforms to combat their rightward tilt, potentially offsetting the effects generated by manosphere influencers (Frenkel 2024). The party must generate media effects of its own rather than tacking to the center to accommodate the pernicious, misogynistic influence of these figures, requiring structural and strategic reforms.

Further, to build a durable coalition, the Democratic Party must reclaim its historic mantle as the party of the working class in policy, messaging, and candidate selection. Long-term realignments in party identification have dissolved allegiances between working class voters and the Democratic Party, with older class and racial divisions supplanted, in part, by a coalition defined by college-educated voters and polarized by both degree and gender (Hopkins and Grossman 2024). Donald Trump, for instance, lost highly educated voters badly but won voters who make less than $100,000 by 4 points despite forwarding an agenda which is likely to harm these voters (CNN 2024). This has also led to an attendant decline in support amongst voters of color, who are, owing to institutionalized racism, more likely to be working-class (Perry et al 2024). It is, however, not too late for the party to win back the working class. Rather than remain a party wedded to the present institutional structure of American politics, the Democrats must take mass rejection from a multiracial working class as a sign to focus on different issues and articulate a new approach to politics (Brooks 2024). This should involve a return to a more acute focus on popular class-first policies. Democrats should return to open support for an increased minimum wage, expanded labor protections, dramatically increased taxes on the rich, and expanded welfare and subsidization for jobs hurt by emerging technologies or economic trends, each of which has massive popular support (Blank 2024, AFGE 2023, FFYF 2023, Meraay 2024). A recognition that the present structure of the American economy, wherein college education represents a necessary passage point to financial stability, doesn’t work for many would provide the Democrats with an exciting platform for the future (Brooks 2024). This may help to reverse the low turnout observed in 2024, as many low-income voters do not resonate with Democrats’ messaging on culture war issues, possibly contributing to lower turnout or even defection (Leip 2024, Hopkins and Grossman 2024). In the case of 2024, it may have also afforded the Harris campaign more grace on economics, as it would involve a distancing from the economic platform of an unpopular incumbent, reducing the effects of retrospective voting (Howell 2023). The party should appoint, as its messengers, people who can authentically speak to the impact of these issues. Better policy is unlikely to be a sufficient condition for an electoral victory, as voters often look to character rather than policy when casting votes for the presidency, meaning messengers of a new platform must themselves be perceived as faithful advocates of working-class interests (Barber 1972). Progressive class politics should form the basis for future Democratic campaigns, helping to define a real non-Trump alternative to the status quo.

The Democratic Party must articulate a clear, long-term vision for the future, refusing to define itself as merely the opposition party to Trump Republicanism. The Harris campaign focused extensively on the consequences of a second Trump administration, arguing that it would spread disunity and result in deleterious policy outcomes such as abortion restrictions (Harris for President 2024 1, 2). This was a sensible move, as these fears are accurate and the Harris campaign could not have assumed the dramatic electoral shifts which took place during this election. However, focusing more acutely on an alternative future would help deter two threats to the Democrats’ electoral outcomes. First, it would win back the large swaths of voters who feel that the country is headed in the wrong direction. Defining a new party agenda which is not strictly in line with institutions as they currently exist could help the Democrats shake an image as out of touch (Pesca 2024). However, such a change may be easier said than done. Intraparty division and a bias toward the status quo may inhibit this effort, worsened by the “hollowness” of party infrastructure; the “party blob”, consisting of powerful interest groups and Democratic-aligned media or activist organizations may inhibit potential internal party reform efforts, as they ipso facto perform many of the traditional roles (and thus sources of power) which the party once maintained (Marantz 2024). If successful, however, such a development could reverse the decline in turnout which Democrats contended with during this election (Leip 2024). Second, the party would more effectively deter the challenge of third parties sapping votes. This alone would not have changed the outcome of the 2024 election, as third-party votes did not, in most swing states, account for the difference between Harris and Trump’s share of the vote (Leip 2024). Nevertheless, it would help prevent losses in closer elections like 2016, as candidates tend to lose out to third parties when voters do not feel well-represented by their platform (Rosenstone et al 1996). Some swing voters felt as though they had little idea what the Harris campaign advocated, (in part, notably, a consequence of a short campaign) which may have been rectified if the party’s platform were clearer (Nagourney 2024). A long-term vision for the future would allow Democrats to more effectively compete with a radicalized and populist Republican party.

The Democratic Party must reconsider its electoral approach to better contest future elections. While 2024 may have been an unfavorable election year, the revelation of trends such as realignment and broad dissatisfaction with institutions makes the case for a restructuring of the party’s electoral approach. The Democratic Party must expand its media strategy to better reach young voters and counteract right-wing influence. Further, Democrats should begin to build a new coalition to win back disaffected working-class voters and recognize that institutional dissatisfaction is unlikely to be a short-term trend. A failure to do so would continue to cede the issue of class to the Republican Party, accelerating income inequality and risking long-term rule by an openly authoritarian movement.

References

AFGE. (2023, October 13). New poll shows 7 in 10 Americans support Labor Unions. American Federation of Government Employees. https://www.afge.org/article/new-poll-shows-7-in-10-americans-support-labor-unions

Anand, V. (2023, December 11). US presidential election 2024: Joe Biden is currently the most unpopular US president in modern history - CNBC TV18. CNBCTV18. https://www.cnbctv18.com/world/joe-biden-is-currently-the-most-unpopular-us-president-in-modern-history—what-ails-his-presidency-18536391.htm

Arceneaux, K. (2024, August 11). The shifting electoral coalitions in American Presidential Politics. Sciences Po CEVIPOF. https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/en/news/the-shifting-electoral-coalitions-in-american-presidential-politics-kevin-arceneaux-director-of-the-cevipof-and-professor-of-political-science-sciences-po/

Barbaro, M., Goldmacher, S., Ploeg, L. V., Wilson, M., Reid, W., Diao, L., Lozano, M., Niemisto, R., & Moxley, A. (2024, November 4). The ad campaign. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/04/podcasts/the-daily/election-campaign-ads.html

Barber, J. (1972). Chapter 1: Presidential Character and How to Foresee It. In Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. essay.

Bimes, T. (2024, October 24). Lecture: General Election Dynamics. The American Presidency, University of California, Berkeley.

Blank, L. (2024, April 26). Voters think it’s time to raise the minimum wage. Data For Progress. https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2024/4/26/voters-think-its-time-to-raise-the-minimum-wage

Boehm, E. (2024, November 8). Throw the bums out. Reason. https://reason.com/2024/11/07/throw-the-bums-out/

Campbell, J. E. (2005). The fundamentals in US presidential elections: Public opinion, the economy and incumbency in the 2004 presidential election. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties, 15(1), 73-83

CNN. (2020). National results 2020 president Exit Polls. https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exit-polls/president/national-results

CNN. (2024). Election 2024: Exit Polls. https://www.cnn.com/election/2024/exit-polls/national-results/general/president/0

Dowd, M. (2024, November 6). It’s this man’s, man’s, man’s world. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/06/opinion/donald-trump-world.html

Ellis, R. (2022). The development of the American presidency. Ch.2. Routledge.

FFYF. (2024, September 27). First 5 things to know about: A new poll showing voter support for child care funding. First Five Years Fund. https://www.ffyf.org/resources/2023/07/july23poll/

Frenkel, S. (2024, November 17). Liberals are left out in the cold as social media veers right. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/17/technology/election-right-wing-social-media.html

Harris for President. (2024). A New Way Forward.

Harris for President. (2024). Who He Is.

Howell, W. (2023). Chapter 6: General Elections. In The American Presidency: An Institutional Approach to Executive Politics. essay.

Hillygus, D. S., & Holbein, J. B. (2020). The Puzzle of Low Youth Turnout. In Making Young Voters: Converting Civic Attitudes into Civic Action. essay.

Grossmann, M., & Hopkins, D. A. (2024). Polarized by degrees: How the diploma divide and the Culture War transformed American politics. Ch. 3-4. Cambridge University Press.

Leip, D. (2024). 2024 Presidential Election Results. Atlas of US Presidential Elections. https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/

Lindsay, J. (2024, November 1). Election 2024: Will the United States follow or Buck the anti-incumbent trend?. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/election-2024-will-*united*\-states-follow-or-buck-anti-incumbent-trend

Marcus, J. (2024, November 7). How Joe Rogan and the right-wing “manosphere” helped propel trump to victory in 2024. The Independent. https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-joe-rogan-adin-ross-b2642756.html

Marantz, A. (2024, August 23). Why was it so hard for the Democrats to replace Biden?. The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/09/02/why-was-it-so-hard-for-the-democrats-to-replace-biden

Meraay, H., Zinn, L. Z. and A., & Schomburg, R. (2024, November 12). Extensive polls find Americans support taxing the wealthy. Inequality.org. https://inequality.org/research/extensive-polls-find-americans-support-taxing-the-wealthy/

Molski, M. (2024, November 6). How voting demographics changed between 2020 and 2024 presidential elections. NBC4 Washington. https://www.nbcwashington.com/decision-2024/2024-voter-turnout-election-demographics-trump-harris/3762138/

Nagourney, A. (2024, November 8). The short campaign may have been Harris’s undoing - and Biden’s fault. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/07/us/politics/biden-harris-campaign.html

Panagopoulos, C. (2013). Campaign duration and election outcomes. Politics and Governance, 1(1), 66-73.

Perry, A., Pipa, A., Pendrak, K., & Donoghoe, M. (2024, January 18). Black wealth is increasing, but so is the racial wealth gap. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/black-wealth-is-increasing-but-so-is-the-racial-wealth-gap/

Pesca, M. (2024, November 14). The HR-ification of the Democratic Party. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/11/democrats-are-the-hr-department-of-political-parties/680634/

Polgreen, L., Douthat, R., Lozada, C., & Cottle, M. (2024, November 8). TL;DR: Blame Biden. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/08/opinion/popular-vote-trump-election-biden.html?showTranscript=1

Sides, J., Tausanovitch, C., & Vavreck, L. (2023). The bitter end: The 2020 presidential campaign and the challenge to American democracy. Princeton University Press.

Stantcheva, S. (2024). Why do we dislike inflation? (No. w32300). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Stephens, B. (2024, November 6). A party of Prigs and Pontificators suffers a humiliating defeat. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/06/opinion/donald-trump-defeat-democrats.html

Thompson, D. (2024, November 6). How Donald Trump won everywhere. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2024/11/donald-trump-covid-election/680559/

Walter, A. (2022, July 22). The Republican Electoral College Advantage. Cook Political Report. https://www.cookpolitical.com/cook-pvi/2022-partisan-voter-index/republican-electoral-college-advantage

Yglesias, M. (2024, November 5). It’s Election Day! It’s Election Day! - by Matthew Yglesias. https://www.slowboring.com/p/its-election-day